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The purpose of this study is to clarify to what extent managers 
engage in successful market timing behavior in UK by issuing 
equity on the London Stock Exchange due to an information 
advantage, while investors fail to identify and compensate for 
this discrepancy. 
 
A quantitative approach using regression analysis has been 
used. 
 
This paper has a theoretical perspective which defines financing 
decisions and behavioral finance within firms. The reason is to 
be able to extract indicators for successful market timing. 
 
All the seasoned equity offerings that have been made on the 
FTSE all non-financial list during 1999-2008 have been used for 
the empirical study. 
 
During the timeframe 1999-2008, the indicator preference for 
equity had a result supporting the presences of successful 
market timing behavior. However, the other two indicators, 
equity ratio change and time since last quarterly report did not 
support our theory, and as a result the findings must be 
considered inconclusive.  
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Chapter 1 – Introduction 
This chapter will give a general introduction to the subject of market timing. Further 
on, it will also introduce the research question for the thesis and its purpose. A 
disposition of the paper is also included. 
1.1 Background 
For a long period of time, researchers have attempted to identify and 
quantify what determines a firm financing decisions and what 
discrepancies between the companies and the market’s expectations can 
affect these choices. Miller and Modigliani (1958) started the debate when 
they created their first cost of capital-model. The model later developed 
into what is today known as the trade off theory. However, many 
researchers have found this theory hard to accept due to its strict 
assumptions.  Myers (1984) found that managers have a preference in 
which order to finance their investment opportunities, where internal 
equity was at the top of the list and external equity at the bottom.  
Nonetheless, times change and more and more researchers have found 
behavioral explanations behind the choice of financing. One such 
explanation is that managers trying to benefit from over- or 
undervaluation’s made by the capital market, this has come to be known 
as market timing.  An implication of the market timing theory is that the 
issuance of seasoned equity offerings (SEO) should be an indicator that a 
firm will, after the issue, perform worse than the market expects.  
Quite a few studies have been made on market timing, some grants 
support and others do not. Reasons for the divergences are that different 
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studies take different approaches. The search for conclusive evidence 
continues.   
1.2 The Financing Decision Puzzle  
Financing decisions and stock returns are fairly mature fields of study 
which have been analyzed in different settings and approaches. Starting 
with stock returns, there is a wide range of measures which are claimed 
to forecast or explain future stock movements. Fama (1970) stated that 
there is an efficient market, where stock returns on average are close to 
zero in the short-term and move randomly, with no predictability in the 
long-term. However, since the creation of the efficient market 
hypotheses, many researchers have attempted to define what causes the 
market to deviate from the efficiency assumption.  
De Bondt and Thaler (1985) showed that past winners are tomorrow’s 
losers, which indicates that the market overreacts to the actions of a 
company. Adding to overreactions by the market are SEOs (Loughran 
and Ritter 1995) and IPOs (Ritter 1991), where SEOs have positive 
abnormal returns pre-issue and reverts to negative abnormal returns 
post-issue. Same effects have been observed with mergers (Asquith 1983, 
Agrawal et al 1992) and new exchange listings (Dharan and Ikenberry 
1995). Nevertheless, some articles argue that winners today are going to 
remain so in the future as well and vice versa. For instance, Michaely et 
al. (1995) shows that dividend initiations are usually done by firms with 
ongoing positive abnormal returns and that firms omitting dividends are 
firms with ongoing negative returns. Also stock splits (Dharan and 
Ikenberry 1995, Ikenberry et al. 1996) and spinoffs (Miles and Rosenfeld 
1983, Cusatis et al. 1993) indicates increasing returns. Fama (1998) 
disagrees with these findings and claims that if they were true, it would 
be time to disregard the efficient market hypotheses.  
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The advocates of market timing theory, such as, Brau and Fawcett (2006) 
have shown that managers of firms going public try to time the market 
when the managers consider it to be the right conditions for both 
industry and market. When it comes to SEOs the studies have produced 
quite different results. Baker and Wurgler (2002) found that capital 
structure is the cumulative outcome of opportunities when firms try to 
time the capital market. However, Mahajan and Tartaroglu (2008) found 
evidence for the dynamic tradeoff theory and consider market timing to 
have a short term effect on leverage. Likewise Chan and Chang (2007) 
found evidence of dynamic tradeoff in their study of Asian companies. 
When Elliot et al. (2008) did their research, they found support for the 
market timing theory and that it had a long lasting effect on capital 
structure. They criticized Baker and Wurgler for using the B/M-ratio, 
since it has multiple interpretations, whereas growth opportunities and 
misvaluation are the main ones. Flannery and Rangan (2006) also posted 
evidence supporting the tradeoff theory, later; they showed that the 
divergence from the optimal capital structure is short-lived for firms that 
have suffered a shock in their leverage. Kayhan and Titman (2007) 
discovered that companies act as if they have a target debt ratio, while 
other factors, such as, growth opportunities and stock price lead to large 
discrepancies from this optimum. Kayhan and Titman assume that these 
divergences are due to manager’s intuitive rationality.  
Today it is hard to find an absolute way of measuring market timing and 
most relevant measures are hard to quantify, since they are based on 
behavior. Studying the research in this field shows a wide variety of 
differing conclusions. We therefore find it interesting to further 
contribute to the area of market timing by studying the connection 
between stock returns and financing decisions closer. Our ambition is to 
define and use a method more focused on indicators of behavior typical 
for market timing.  
Also, since most of the studies made have been focused on financing 
decision in the US market, we want to be able to shed new light to the 
applicability of market timing theory on the UK market. 
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1.3 Purpose 
The purpose of this study is to clarify to what degree managers engage in 
successful market timing behavior in UK by issuing equity on the 
London Stock Exchange due to an information advantage, while 
investors fail to identify and compensate for this discrepancy. 
1.4 Target Audience 
The target audience of this thesis is people with an understanding of 
corporate finance, such as academia and researchers within the field as 
well as managers and investors. Therefore there will be no explanation of 
terms and mechanisms which can be assumed to be widely understood by 
the audience.  
1.5 Limitations 
This study’s purpose is to test successful market timing. Based on this, 
there will be no testing of market timing alone. Further on, we will not 
test for tradeoff theory and pecking order separately. So even if we are 
doing a study in financing decisions, it is limited to successful decisions 
within market timing and no other. Reasons for these limitations are 
mainly the time frame.  
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1.6 Disposition 
The first chapter aims to give a brief introduction to the field of 
financing decisions in general with a bit more focus on market timing. It 
also describes the purpose of this study. The second chapter is the 
literature review, which describes the different theories within financing 
decisions. The third chapter describes and motivates the sample, 
calculations, methods used and their drawbacks. Chapter four presents 
the empirical research and its findings. The fifth chapter is a discussion 
regarding the findings. The sixth chapter contains conclusions and 
suggestions for further research. 
10 
 
Chapter 2 - Theory 
This chapter will introduce the reader to theories that are considered relevant for the 
thesis. The main focus will be around financing decisions, capital structure and stock 
returns as an anomaly. 
2.1 Tradeoff Theory 
The capital structure of the firm and the issues, such as a firm’s decision 
on how to finance the operations and on what level of leverage to use has 
been the focus of many studies in the past. One of the most influential 
and dominant theories is the tradeoff theory which was first described by 
Modigliani and Miller (1963) and is based on the idea that firms have an 
optimal capital structure determined by the cost and benefits of issuing 
debt or equity. According to Myers (1984), firms attempt to balance the 
value of interest tax shield against various adjusted costs, costs of 
bankruptcies and financial distress. Firms should therefore decide to 
exchange debt for equity or equity for debt in order to maximize the 
value of the firm. There is no generic optimal capital structure for all 
firms; every firm has its unique optimal structure with limited level of 
leverage. Therefore, the level of leverage depends on the marginal tax rate 
that the company has and, the cost of bankruptcy or financial distress.  
The static tradeoff theory, also known as the one period model, would 
hold if the cost of the adjustments would be zero, because in the absence 
of adjustment costs the firm’s current debt-to-value ratio is considered to 
be optimal. However, Myers argues that there must be lagged feedbacks 
into the costs, thus adjusting the optimum capital structure. He further 
argues that firms are not flexible enough to adjust quickly to random 
events that move them from the optimum. If the adjustment costs are 
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high the firm will deviate more from the targeted debt ratio, if they are 
low the firm will remain closer to the targeted ratio.  In the tradeoff 
theory, debt is considered the more favorable financial instrument when 
financing, in relation to equity. When companies issue debt, they can use 
interest deductibility to create value for the shareholders. The increase of 
debt will increase the leverage and at the same time decrease the ratio of 
equity in the firm.  In line with Modigliani and Millers second 
proposition, if the company has an increasing marginal tax rate, it gains 
more by borrowing. 
According to Modigliani and Miller (1963) the cost of bankruptcy and 
financial distress cannot be considered in isolation. In order to fully 
understand the effects of these factors, tradeoff theory has to incorporate 
agency cost and moral hazard problems. Myers (1984) argues that there 
are two characteristics of financial distress that are worth paying 
attention to. The first characteristic is that firms with more intangible 
assets and growth opportunities issue less debt, compared to the firms 
with more tangible assets. Hence, the value lost due to financial distress is 
higher for the firms with intangible assets. The second characteristic is 
that firms with higher risk tend to borrow less, because they have a 
higher probability of default leading to higher financial distress costs. 
In reality firms operate over many periods and analyzing capital 
structure from the static point of view is not sufficient. In the dynamic 
model, a firms financing does not depend solely on the targeted leverage, 
but on the expected financial margins in the next period as well.  
The papers written by Kane et al. (1984), Brennan and Schwartz (1984) 
analyzed dynamic models that included uncertainty, bankruptcy cost and 
taxes. One disadvantage of these studies is that they do not take into 
consideration transaction cost. According to these papers, in case of 
financial distress firms could rapidly rebalance without incurring any 
cost. To avoid this rebalancing problem Fischer et al. (1989) introduced 
transaction cost into the model. According to them, as a result of the 
transaction cost, firms can allow its capital structure to drift within a 
certain range.  The firms can pay existing debt with retained earnings, 
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and when the leverage range is achieved, the firm can recapitalize. On the 
other hand, if the firms have operational losses, debt will increase within 
the leverage range. Therefore the dynamic model adds more aspects 
which grant the trade-off theory more credibility than the original static 
model.  
2.2 Pecking Order 
Pecking order, compared to the static tradeoff theory, has no defined 
debt-to-value ratio or optimal capital structure considerations. It is 
perceived as a hierarchy of preference for ways of financing.  
According to Myers (1984) firms prefer internal funds over external and 
the dividend ratio is adjusted to future investment opportunities. 
Nonetheless, dividend policies are sticky, which can give rise to the need 
for external financing. In those cases firms usually chose debt over 
external equity. One reason for the pecking order is that managers want 
to avoid the tough scrutiny of the capital market; hence it is better to rely 
on internal funds. When in a distressed situation and with external funds 
being the only options, Myers argues that firms will, if possible, issue 
debt before equity. This is because a company which wants to issue 
equity usually has to issue a higher number of shares since equity issues 
are usually done at a discount as compared to the market value. When 
the NPV of the investment is not high enough to justify this discount the 
firm will rather forgo the opportunity than reduce the shareholder’s 
intrinsic value. From the company’s perspective, the value of debt is not 
dependent on the manager’s actions or information asymmetry in 
general.  
According to Myers and Majluf (1984) if a firm has the possibility to 
invest in a positive NPV project, then the firm should always issue new 
equity if needed. However, this assumes an efficient capital market, 
where the firm would sell shares at a fair price on average. In their 
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theory, Myers and Majluf consider both asymmetric information and 
management actions to be beneficial for passive, present shareholders. 
This implies that managers prefer issuing debt before equity and that the 
stock price effect will be smaller when the firms uses debt. Regarding 
pecking order, Myers and Majluf claim managers are willing to abstain 
from SEOs half of the time and to issue equity the remaining time, 
reason being the assumed average gain/loss is zero.  
2.3 Information Asymmetry 
Any description of information asymmetry is best started with Akerlof 
(1970). He argues that all cars, good or bad, are sold at the same price. 
This is because it is only the seller who has the information necessary to 
understand the true value. The market will therefore assume all cars to be 
lemons and price them accordingly. Since good cars would then be 
underpriced this would lead to a non-existence of good cars on the 
market. This could also be true about companies doing a seasoned equity 
offering according to Korajczyk et al. (1991). If there would be the same 
asymmetric information about all firms, then all of them would be 
priced equally and the stock movement would be unaffected when doing 
an equity issue. This would deter all good companies from approaching 
the market apart from periods when the information asymmetry is as 
low as possible.  
Further on, Leland and Pyle (1977) contributes with a discussion in their 
paper where they argue that entrepreneurs can take actions that raises 
confidence, which should lower the information asymmetry, thus raising 
the willingness of an investor to invest in the project/firm. This signaling 
effect could be derived from the insider’s holdings and motivation to 
keep his share. The result of this should be a more fair valuation of the 
firm by the investors. A study made by Chazi and Tripathy (2007) found 
that the insider information of over-valuation outweighed the negative 
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signal of an equity issue. This is because insider sales run a higher risk of 
being influenced by cycles, which also gives rise to a higher tendency for 
insiders to sell at a more favorable share price.  
Myers and Majluf (1984) then adds to the problem with semi-strong 
markets, where management has more information than investors and 
will avoid issuing new equity, which management would consider an act 
in the interest of old stockholders. Myers and Majluf sees information 
asymmetry as an unavoidable fact of life, which both managers and 
investors are aware of. In a different study made by Korajczyk et al. 
(1991) it is argued that information asymmetry cannot be a complete 
description of financing decisions. When firms release financial reports 
and other information, they are making the market better informed 
about themselves, hence, giving rise to opportunities for equity issues. 
Since outsiders now knows more, and does not lower the valuations to 
the same extent, the results are less significant price drops.  
Giving weight to this argument, Korajczyk et al. points to two extreme 
cases. Both include the cost of delaying a project, cost of postponing an 
equity issue and the time value of retrieving more positive information. 
The first extreme is if investments cannot be delayed without being lost 
immediately. Better quality firms would then avoid making equity issues, 
leading to a lemons issues market for investors, where only the lower 
quality firms issue equity. This would result in an increasing price drop 
for issuing firms. The second extreme is when a firm does not have any 
cost in delaying a project. Then all firms acting in the shareholders 
interests would delay the equity issue until when the lowest information 
asymmetry is possible, thus creating a market where high quality firms 
issue close to financial releases and low quality firms issue all the time. 
However, these are two extremes and Korajczyk et al. expect the reality 
to be somewhere in between, as firms can receive either good or bad 
private information about their value. The firms in possession of bad 
information would issue immediately and the firms having good news 
will wait until the information is made public. The results their study 
find is that most equity issues is done within a short time frame after an 
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information releases and that there is a increasing decline in stock price 
the longer the firms wait.  
Another point of view regarding information asymmetry is conveyed by 
Miller and Rock (1985) who discusses dividend announcements and their 
relation to lowering asymmetric information. They describe what they 
call dividend surprise; this is either a larger-than-expected or lower-than-
expected dividend, which in turn gives a prediction of the future 
earnings. They connect this effect to a firm announcing that it will be 
using external financing and the following stock price reaction. The 
reaction is often negative, since the market expects internal funds to be 
sufficient, meaning external financing is perceived as bad news. Hence, 
firms announcing larger-than-expected dividends will have greater 
earnings and consequently a stock price increase. On the other hand, 
firms which need large external financing usually have lower-than-
expected cash flows and earnings, followed by a negative dividend 
announcement.  
2.4 Market Timing 
A survey made by Brau and Fawcett (2006) found that CFOs tries to 
time the market when they are making an IPO, which is contradictory to 
Myers’s study in 1984 which lay the foundation for the pecking order. 
Brau and Fawcett also found that companies which recognized 
themselves as undervalued when they issued equity seldom return to issue 
again. 
Even Myers and Majluf (1984) suggest in their article that managers 
should try to time the market. They argue that managers which have 
financial slack avoid issuing equity to finance an investment opportunity. 
Thus managers are avoiding the risk of being forced to issue equity when 
undervalued, but can chose to do so when overvalued. The reason why 
firms have a tendency to prefer debt over equity is mostly determined by 
16 
 
information asymmetry regarding a firm’s true value and as such the 
financing behavior of the firm. Therefore information asymmetry 
regarding risk is of little relevance and cannot, according to Myers and 
Majluf, be a reason for the debt-equity choice.  
According to Baker and Wurgler (2002), equity market timing means 
that firms issue equity at high stock prices and repurchase at low. In 
other words, firms try to time the fluctuations of their stock price in 
relation to the cost of equity and in comparison to other capital and its 
costs. If managers have an incentive to benefit current shareholders, they 
will also do so at the cost of new and former shareholders. Baker and 
Wurgler find that market-to-book ratios from ten years earlier have an 
impact on the capital structure today, indicating that fluctuations in the 
market value strongly influence the capital structure. Their theory is 
stated as: “Capital structure is the cumulative outcome of attempts to 
time the equity market” (Baker and Wurgler 2002:3). They base their 
study on the assumption that either both managers and investors are 
rational, or managers think that investors are irrational. Baker and 
Wurgler find that book leverage after an issue first decreases and then 
starts to rise slightly. However, during this 10 year post-issue period they 
find that the market value increases quite strongly. The increase in asset 
is mostly derived from debt, then equity and last retained earnings, thus 
contradicting the pecking order. Higher market-to-book ratio usually 
results in higher net equity issues. Profitable firms tend to lower the 
leverage through retained earnings and larger firms usually issue less 
equity in comparison to assets. When firms have an opportunity to 
change its leverage through external financing, their valuation becomes 
the most important determinant. The findings where that a high market 
value leads to a reduction in leverage in the short-term, and that a 
historically high market value often comes with a low leverage.  
The market timing theory does not require markets to be inefficient or 
that managers can forecast stock returns, it is rather the assumption that 
managers believe they can time the market. Baker and Wurgler also find 
that mispricing is the main reason for equity market timing, and further 
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on, the abnormal returns following the equity issue are greater than the 
announcement effect. 
2.4.1 Financing Decisions 
Most research papers on capital structure theory originate from Miller 
and Modigliani and a lot of attempts have been made to either prove or 
disprove their model. Taggart (1977) found a relationship between facing 
a financing deficit by using external financing and the market value of the 
company. Taggart then explained that the optimal capital structure is 
postponed by these decisions and gradual corrections towards the 
optimum are done in the long-term. The effect of timing strategies are 
somewhat uncertain, they can either postpone or speed-up the 
adjustments to an optimal capital structure.  
A study made by Marsh (1982), indicated that small firms with high P/E-
ratios and high gearing, have a higher tendency to issue equity. He argues 
for a managerial explanation, the first being that managers distrust 
against market efficiency and the second that managers feel more 
comfortable to approach the owners when the share price is more 
favorable. Marsh found that most firms remain around a long-term debt 
level; however, there are indications of short-term fluctuations arising 
from timing strategies and the general state of the capital markets.  
Asquith and Mullins (1986) explain that their findings mainly support 
pecking order, but when a SEO is to be used, companies should try to 
time the market to reduce the adverse reduction in market value. Further 
on, a financing decision should be regarded as having the same signaling 
effect as the investment policy, the capital structure policy and the 
dividend policy, joint together. This signaling is also related to the one 
arising when doing stock repurchases, which on the contrary has a 
positive effect. Asquith and Mullins also suggest that managers have 
superior information compared to investors.  
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Not all studies find positive results for market timing. In an empirical 
research made by Jung et al. (1996) they tested the timing theory, agency 
theory and pecking order. They tested which of these theories best 
describes why firms issue equity and their financing decision. Jung et al. 
found in this study very little evidence for timing strategies. The 
strongest evidence was for agency theory and the stock market reaction 
suggest that many companies issuing equity were not expected to do so, 
and thus they received a negative reaction from investors.  
Also in a paper made by Hovakimian et al. (2001) the results showed a 
divergence between reasons companies have when deciding on what way 
to finance. This article focused on a firms financing decision, both when 
raising capital or changing the capital structure. Hovakimian et al. found 
a separation between the decisions. When a firm can choose between 
retiring debt or repurchase stock, they have a tendency to re-leverage 
towards an optimal capital structure, thus basing their decision on capital 
structure. Contrary to this is when the company is to raise external 
capital. Then most firms take into consideration their current market 
value and if they perceive themselves as over- or undervalued. This will 
indicate that a firm with an investment opportunity will consider its 
market value before the capital structure. This empirical evidence is thus 
more in line with a dynamic trade-off model.  
According to Myers (1984) market timing should not be possible if 
investors are rational. This is due to investors on average assuming that 
only overpriced firms issue equity, thus all companies doing a SEO are 
sending negative signals and will lose in value. Myers later on argues that 
a firm issuing equity should decrease in market value and the opposite is 
true for those that repurchase shares.  
A research paper written by Walker and Yost (2008) found that firms 
whom are specific about what the funds from the SEO are going to be 
used for, generally have a more positive reaction from the market. In 
comparison firms that state a purpose of general use receive a more 
negative reaction. The reason for this, they argue, is that the market 
perceives companies that are more specific to have value creating 
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opportunities. On the other hand, firms with a general purpose are 
perceived by the market as value destroying. Walker and Yost argue that 
the general purpose issues have a higher tendency to come with 
managerial entrenchment and high agency costs attached. They also show 
that companies which are specific usually do not change their leverage, 
where as the non-specific do change it.  
A different study by Kim and Weisbach (2008), focused on the use from 
the proceeds, found that firms center around three different motivations 
when raising equity through SEOs. The first is that the proceeds are to be 
used for financing of investments, leading to a large increase in assets and 
R&D. The second is transfer of wealth, where current shareholders 
benefits from selling overpriced equity to new shareholders at the time of 
the SEO. The third is that firms use the proceeds to increase their 
liquidity. Their results indicate that, of the amount raised in the SEO, a 
great majority goes to financing of investment and then as a transfer of 
wealth, and last to increase liquidity.  
2.4.2 Stock Returns and Equity Offerings 
Many studies find that companies doing either an IPO or SEO have to 
offer their shares at a discount. However, most of these are done in a 
short-term perspective and few go beyond initial returns or the day of 
the announcement. However, Baker and Wurgler (2000) did a study 
covering issues made 1928-1997 in which they found a pattern among 
firms making a SEO and a timing strategy. Their empirical findings 
demonstrate that firms which issue equity at the peak in a hot market1
                                            
1 A hot market is the period in time when the number of IPOs and SEOs have a high increase 
compared to the years before.  
 
usually performed worse the coming year. According to Baker and 
Wurgler, this indicates that firms time the market when they issue equity 
or more precisely take advantage of inefficiencies in the market.  
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A different examination made by Asquith and Mullins (1986) proposes 
two views on the stock price effect following the announcement of a 
SEO. First view described is a downward sloping demand curve for a 
firm’s shares, thus making them decrease when a higher quantity is 
offered. The second is that an efficient market does not consider numbers 
of shares but the underlying value, or a steady cash flow and therefore 
share price should not change because of an SEO. Asquith and Mullins 
find a significant negative effect on the share price at the announcement 
day. They also found a strong timing pattern, where on average the firms 
doing an SEO outperformed the market by 33% in a two year period 
prior to the issue while underperforming by 6% on average after the 
SEO. 
In a different study made by Ritter (1991), analyzing the long-run return 
of IPOs he found that a share sold at a discount gained on average 16.4% 
the first day of trading. He also found that firms going public during a 
hot market underperformed in comparison to their industry, which 
suggests that on average in the long-run, an IPO cannot be seen as 
underpriced, but rather overpriced. Both because investors are overly 
optimistic about young firms with growth potential and that those firms 
try to time the “window of opportunity” which arise in the hot market. 
When Ritter divided the IPO firms into industries he only found three 
industries which outperformed their peers, these were financial 
institutions, drug companies and airlines. However, financial institutions 
had a mean age of 43 years, which far surpass the other industries. Ritter 
points to the result that if these are removed from the sample, the 
underperformance becomes even greater. 
A more recent study made by Loughran and Ritter (1995) found that the 
underperformance of IPOs last for five years. More interestingly, 
companies doing an SEO also underperform on average. Loughran and 
Ritter also show that the firms issuing during a hot season usually 
underperform, while the companies issuing when there is little activity 
barley or not at all underperform the market. They also found that even 
if the period measured started a year after the SEO, the issuing firm still 
underperformed. Regarding what Loughran and Ritter found, a firm 
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announcing a SEO should lose approximately 33% on the day of 
announcement, and not 3% which is most often the case. So even if the 
firm was overvalued before the issue, it still remains so after as well. A 
study from the same period written by Speiss and Affleck-Graves (1995) 
reached the same conclusions, but also found that managers, due to more 
firm-specific information, could time the market when this was more 
beneficial. Jegadeesh (2000) found in his research that firms, issuing 
within two days before and one day after earnings being announced, 
performed even worse compared to firms outside these windows. He saw 
this as a biased expectation from the investors. 
In a study done by Lucas and McDonald (1990) they find that, on 
average, firms which issue equity have an abnormal return before the 
issue. But a large part of the companies in their study had a negative 
return preceding the issue. They also found a negative announcement 
effect, but the following period appeared to have a normal return. They 
argue that firms which are undervalued will wait to issue equity until 
their price have been corrected compared to overvalued firms which 
would issue immediately. The reason being that managers know the 
market does not have enough information to price them correctly and 
wait in order to gain value.  
Eckbo et al. (2000) offer some criticism to this argument. They argue that 
Loughran and Ritter did not measure enough factors for their control 
portfolio. According to Eckbo et al. firm making a SEO will lower its 
leverage, thus also reducing the risk of default and dependence of 
unexpected inflation. Because Loughran and Ritter do not give these risks 
a consideration in their β, it cannot result in a different way. However, 
the main difference between these approaches is that the 
underperformance is significantly lower. So by adjusting for the new risk 
characteristics and thus using a better control portfolio, Eckbo et al. 
consider themselves to have found a better measurement for SEOs 
performance. Another interesting aspect added by Eckbo et al. is that 
SEO firms increase their stock turnover, which usually is a sign of higher 
liquidity and lower risk, thus further adding to their theory. 
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Fama (1998), the father of the efficient market hypothesis, challenges the 
recent studies made within behavioral finance and stock returns. He 
consider most of the studies conducted on overreaction or underreaction 
to be lacking credibility, mostly because they cannot seem to agree on 
what creates the reaction and if it is an anomaly, and also the fact that 
most studies ignores chance. Because, even if past winners are today’s 
losers and vice versa, the result of the study should not end in more over- 
or underreaction, which indicates efficient markets. Fama also argues that 
most of the studies are “splashy” when choosing the sample, in other 
words, “self-made results”. He further questions if these studies can 
deliver a bigger picture that better explains the market than the efficient 
market hypothesis, which he claims they cannot do. He argues this is 
because the other studies get contradictory results and as mentioned, 
keeps a very narrow focus. Fama also shows that if there is an anomaly 
among companies making an SEO, then this can only be attributable to 
very small firms or else the variables have not been chosen correctly.  
Given the criticism by Fama, Baker and Wurgler (2000) took a different 
approach and adjusted their tests of market timing for market efficiency. 
Since their result yielded negative returns for several occasions, they also 
concluded that market efficiency cannot be assumed because efficient 
markets have a return slightly above zero on average. Their study show 
that the equity share in SEO has the highest explanatory power for the 
coming year compared to the control variables which consist of dividend 
yield and market-to-book. Nonetheless, Baker and Wurgler point out 
that equity share by itself cannot disprove efficient market. Firstly, they 
consider the Modigliani and Miller effect, which explains changes in 
return when the leverage changes, but their results indicate that this only 
explains about 5% of the change in the equity share. Secondly, Baker and 
Wurgler consider investments and financing, where they measure the 
relation between the equity share and total investment, new issues and 
the equity issue. The relation between these variables is expected to be 
negative, but they find a slightly positive relationship. They interpret this 
result as equity share being the variable that contains the most 
information about future return, and not capital structure cost or 
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investments. This indicates the investment financed is more important 
than the level of investments. The last factor being tested is market 
timing. Baker and Wurgler find evidence for investor sentiment which is 
usually present during hot markets. The reasoning behind this is that 
when one firm is overvalued, there tend to be several others that are 
overvalued, and when firms are overvalued managers prefer to issue 
equity. However, this overvaluation tends to return to the efficient price, 
caused by arbitrage. The conclusion is that when investors are overly 
optimistic, managers time the market due to overvaluation, thus the 
increase of the equity share in new issues and the decrease when the cycle 
turns around.  
2.5 Summary of Theories 
Table 2.1: Summary of Theories 
Theory: Main Authors: 
Static tradeoff Modigliani & Miller (1958, 1963), Myers (1984) 
Dynamic tradeoff Kane et al. (1984), Brennan & Schwartz (1984), 
Fischer et al. (1989) 
Pecking Order Myers (1984), Myers & Majluf (1984) 
Information Asymmetry Akerlof (1970), Leland & Pyle (1977), Myers & 
Majluf (1984) 
Market Timing Baker & Wurgler (2002, 2002) 
- Financing Decisions Taggart (1977), Marsh (1982), Asquith & Mullins 
(1986) 
- Stock Returns Asquith & Mullins (1986), Lucas & McDonald 
(1990), Ritter (1991), Loughran & Ritter (1995) 
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Chapter 3 - Methodology  
This chapter will explain our indicators and the rationale for choosing them. In this 
chapter there is also an explanation of the regression model that we are to use. It also 
gives reasons for our dataset, criticism, method, limitations and validity. 
3.1 Introduction  
The goal of this study is to find support for the existence of successful 
market timing behavior. The method to approach this objective will be 
by quantifying indicators of successful market timing and relate them to 
how well companies perform the coming twelve months after an SEO. 
The results will then be related to market timing theory and to what 
extent they support successful market timing behavior from companies 
issuing equity. 
According to Kim and Weisbach (2008) there are three main motivations 
for companies to issue equity which have been used to distinct SEOs 
reasons to time the market from other reasons. The motivations are:  
• To finance a profitable investment,  
• To take advantage of a company overvaluation in order to 
transfer wealth from new shareholders to existing ones 
• To increase the company's liquidity.  
These are not mutually exclusive, but the type of market timing we are 
looking for is best described by the second one, transferring wealth to 
existing shareholders by using an information asymmetry advantage. 
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For these purposes we have defined the following criteria for successful 
market timing behavior: 
• Management should, correctly, consider investors to be 
irrational by the definition that the company is being 
overvalued by the market.  
• To be successful, the companies must be able to issue equity 
at a price where the signaling effect does not exceed the 
overvaluation. 
We have chosen a deductive approach, in which we have formulated a 
hypothesis based on prior theories described in the previous chapter and 
some expanded reasoning which will be further explained when put into 
context. The hypothesis will then be tested against the collected data to 
see if we can find support for it. 
3.2 Dataset 
The dataset consists of SEO issues conducted by non-financial companies 
on the London Stock Exchange2
• A restriction in this sample is that companies with less than 
£10 million in their book value have been excluded due to 
them not being individually specified.  
 for the period 1999-2008. The analysis of 
the SEOs requires us to collect data before and after the issues which 
gives us a data period of 1997-2009.  
• We have also restricted the sample by removing issues by 
companies classified as financial. The reason to exclude 
financial companies is that they have a different regulatory 
                                            
2 The non financial specification used is Datastream FTSE all non-financial. 
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system compared to the other companies, and which has 
considerable impact on how they can be financed.  
• From the initial sample we have also removed companies 
for which complete information on book value of equity, 
book value of debt, monthly stock return, and end of fiscal 
year period where not readily available 
• Subsequent issues by companies which made additional 
equity issues within twelve months of the first issues have 
been removed since the model would give them more 
consideration than is justified. 
• Also, in our measure of equity preference, nine outliers have 
been removed for reasons specified in 3.4.2. 
In total 553 equity issues by non financial companies where reduced to 
249.    
3.3 Variables 
The indicators require data on; 
• Book value of debt (BVD), retrieved from the DataStream 
Worldscope data type ‘03251‘3
• Book value of equity (BVE), retrieved from the DataStream 
Worldscope data type ‘DWSE’
 
4
• Return index (RI), retrieved from the DataStream data type 
‘RI’
 
5
                                            
3 LONG TERM DEBT represents all interest bearing financial obligations, excluding amounts due 
within one year. 
  
4 COMMON SHAREHOLDERS DEBT represents common shareholders’ investment in the 
company retrieved from the balance sheet. 
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• End of fiscal period, retrieved from the DataStream data 
type ‘05352’ 
Due to lack of information on quarterly reporting for all companies in 
the dataset for book value of equity and debt we consistently used yearly 
numbers.  End of fiscal period was calculated using Datastream reporting 
of the last annual fiscal end date, and increasing them by three, six, and 
nine months.  For purposes of manageability of data we used end of the 
month values as a basis for our calculations of return increases.  
3.4 Indicators 
We have built the following measures as indicators of market timing 
behavior.  
3.4.1 Equity Ratio Change (ERCH) 
The part of the model which includes equity ratio change is based on the 
idea that a company either attempt to stay around a target capital 
structure, or are changing it based on beneficial opportunities which 
might come their way.  
The reasoning is based on Baker and Wurgler (2002) second assumption, 
where managers believe that investors are irrational, which would 
indicate successful market timing. The Baker and Wurgler (2002) study 
found support that capital structure is highly affected by attempts to time 
the market.  
                                                                                                                       
5 The return index represents the theoretical aggregate growth in value of the constituents of the 
index. The index constituents are deemed to return an aggregate daily dividend which is included 
as an incremental amount to the daily change in price index. 
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The change in equity ratio is calculated by subtracting prior year’s equity 
ratio to the issuing year equity ratio. This measure will tell us if the 
company is using the issue to re-lever or as a support of an ongoing 
balanced financing strategy. 
Eq. 3.1 
 
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑟𝑟 𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎:  𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸0
𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸0 + 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 𝐷𝐷𝑎𝑎𝐷𝐷𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸0 − 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸−1𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸−1 + 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 𝐷𝐷𝑎𝑎𝐷𝐷𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸−1 
 
𝑊𝑊ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎 𝐸𝐸0 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 𝐸𝐸ℎ𝑎𝑎 𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝐸𝐸𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐸𝐸𝑎𝑎 𝑓𝑓𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓 𝐸𝐸𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 𝑣𝑣𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓𝐸𝐸𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖  
 
Fig. 3.1: Example of Successful Market Timing Behavior in 
Equity Ratio Change 
 
 Source: Created by the authors 
 
We expect that, acting accordingly to market timing, issuing equity 
would, in annual total, increase share of equity in the firm. If the market 
timing behavior is on average successful it would lead to lower returns 
compared to the market during the next twelve months. More or less all 
companies issuing equity will to some extent change their capital 
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structure over a year. Therefore we will raise the ERCH-indicator to the 
3rd power6
3.4.2 Preference for Equity (PRE) 
 in the regressions to better reflect the suggested impact of 
diversions due to deliberate management decisions. 
According to trade-off theory, preferably investments should be financed 
by debt until the leveraged risk makes debt more costly than equity. 
Also, pecking order claims a management preference for debt over equity 
when it comes to external financing. Going against these rationales and 
finance by external equity would indicate that the company is either 
trying to time the market or is in a position of liquidity needs. 
Therefore we use the part of net refinancing which consist of equity for 
the issuing companies as an indicator of whether or not they have a 
preference for equity and if it had a negative effect on the companies 
return over the market return. The influences for this indicator can be 
found in Baker and Wurgler (2000), Loughran and Ritter (1995), Asquith 
and Mullins (1986), Lucas and McDonald (1990). 
  
                                            
6 Giving the regression an incremental effect at higher or lower levels of change. 
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We choose to compare the issue year’s total equity financing as a part of 
absolute change in total financing to its debt equivalent and created the 
following indicator: 
Eq. 3.2 
 
𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎 𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝐸𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎: ∆𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸0 − ∆𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 𝐷𝐷𝑎𝑎𝐷𝐷𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸0
�(∆𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸0 + ∆𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 𝐷𝐷𝑎𝑎𝐷𝐷𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸0)2 
 
Fig. 3.2: Example of Successful Market Timing 
Behavior in Preference for Equity 
 Source: Created by the authors  
 
To clarify, these are our interpretations of the indicator PRE:  
Table 3.1 Preference Indicator Interpretation 
Value of indicator Possible interpretation 
𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭 𝒑𝒑𝒑𝒑𝒑𝒑𝒑𝒑𝒑𝒑𝒑𝒑𝒑𝒑𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝒑𝒑 > 0 Preference for equity during issue year. 
𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭 𝒑𝒑𝒑𝒑𝒑𝒑𝒑𝒑𝒑𝒑𝒑𝒑𝒑𝒑𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝒑𝒑 < 0 Preference for debt during issue year. 
𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭 𝒑𝒑𝒑𝒑𝒑𝒑𝒑𝒑𝒑𝒑𝒑𝒑𝒑𝒑𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝒑𝒑 > 1 Strong preference for equity over debt (repayment of debt by increasing 
equity) during issue year. 
𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭 𝒑𝒑𝒑𝒑𝒑𝒑𝒑𝒑𝒑𝒑𝒑𝒑𝒑𝒑𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝒑𝒑< −𝟏𝟏 Strong preference for debt over equity (retirement of equity by increasing of 
debt) during issue year. 
 
A flaw in this measure is that the companies might prefer debt financing 
but not have the option due to various reasons such as liquidity 
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problems, lack of collateral, etc. Another flaw is that if, for example, the 
increase in book value of equity roughly corresponds to the decrease in 
book value of debt the denominator will be very small and give a 
misrepresenting extreme value, which would bias our results. Thus, to 
make the dataset more representative we removed 9 observations lower 
than -4 or higher than 4. 
3.4.3   Time Since Last Quarterly Report (TSLQR) 
One reasonable assumption is that overvaluations are most likely to 
occur when publicly available information is non-current. Following 
this, companies who are not overvalued and issue equity to finance a 
promising investment opportunity in the future are more likely to issue 
equity shortly after a recent report to avoid sending the wrong signals to 
the market. On the other hand, companies who issue equity, mainly to 
gain from what they perceive as a temporary overvaluation are more 
likely to issue equity before a report can adjust the market’s expectations.   
Fig 3.3: An illustration of a company conducting in accordance with 
successful market timing.  
 
Source: Created by the authors 
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Jegadeesh (2000) found that companies issuing equity in a time period 
mainly consisting of the days before a report on average performed 
worse than their peers after the consecutive report. Korajczyk et al. (1991) 
and Chazi and Tripathy (2007) also made a case for this preference 
among firms.  
Hence, the third indicator uses the time from the last quarterly report as 
an indicator for the diminishing value of the information available to the 
market. In other words we wanted to see whether companies which made 
issues further from the last quarterly reports were more or less likely to 
perform worse as compared to the market during the following year.    
Eq. 3.3 
 
𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎 𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎 𝐿𝐿𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝐸𝐸 𝑄𝑄𝐸𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝐸𝐸𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓𝐸𝐸 𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝐸𝐸: 𝐷𝐷𝑟𝑟𝐸𝐸𝑎𝑎 𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐸𝐸𝑎𝑎 − 𝐸𝐸𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟 𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓 𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝐸𝐸 𝑓𝑓𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝐸𝐸𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟3 𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝐸𝐸ℎ𝑖𝑖  
 
Fig. 3.4 Example of Successful Market Timing Behavior in 
Time Since Last Quarterly Report 
 
 
 Source: Created by the authors 
 
Flaws in this measure includes that some companies might have other 
information available which we cannot for practical and consistency 
reasons take into account in the model.  
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3.4.4   Change in Return Compared to the Market (ROM) 
In order to compare the indicators to the following twelve months 
performance we are using a return index.  
The return index (RI) is a measure used by DataStream to measure 
absolute aggregate value growth. It uses the daily increase in share price 
and a daily allocation of the dividend yield to create the index.  
Our dataset uses the RI at the end of each month. The period of return 
used is the twelve months up to the issue to measure ingoing 
performance and the following twelve months to measure performance 
after the issue. A similar measure is created for FTSE all non-financial list 
to provide a measure for the stock’s performance relative to the market. 
Lastly the company’s performance relative to the market for the twelve 
pre-issue months is compared to the twelve post issue months to see the 
company’s relative performance change.  
Fama (1998) has criticized studies for not taking risk into account in their 
research. Baker and Wurgler (2000, 2002) defended not using risk 
adjustment, arguing that market timing situations describe inefficiency in 
the market, and therefore existing risk measures would bias the results. In 
line with the later argument there will be no risk adjustments made in 
our model. 
Adjusting for the market’s performance is done under the assumption 
that the company board and managers does not have information 
superior to the market on the future of the general economy but only on 
matters of the own company’s future performance. 
Eq. 3.4 
𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑎𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎 𝑟𝑟𝑣𝑣𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟 𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝐸𝐸: 
�
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝐸𝐸  𝐸𝐸+1
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝐸𝐸  𝐸𝐸0 − 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝐸𝐸  𝐸𝐸+1𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝐸𝐸  𝐸𝐸0 � − � 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝐸𝐸  𝐸𝐸0𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝐸𝐸  𝐸𝐸−1 − 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝐸𝐸  𝐸𝐸0𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝐸𝐸  𝐸𝐸−1� 
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3.5 Quantitative Analysis 
The quantitative analysis of this study will test the hypothesis if the three 
indicators of our model equity ratio change (ERCH), preference for 
equity (PRE) and time since last quarterly report (TSLQR) are negatively 
related to return over market (ROM) in order to find support for 
successful market timing.  
3.5.1 Regression Model 
We will perform regression analysis7
The general regression models consists of the change in the company’s 
return compared to the market (ROM) as the dependent indicator, 
whereas the independent variables will consist of the previously 
described indicators equity ratio change (ERCH) , preference for equity 
(PRE)  and time since quarterly report (TSLQR). We will run four 
regressions in total, firstly regressing all independent indicators 
individually, equations are presented below: 
 by Ordinary Least Square (OLS) 
method. Since our data is cross sectional we do not have to worry about 
autocorrelation.   
Eq. 3.5 
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀 =  𝛽𝛽1 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸 + 𝜀𝜀 
Eq. 3.6 
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀 =  𝛽𝛽1 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸 + 𝜀𝜀 
Eq. 3.7    𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀 =  𝛽𝛽1 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝑄𝑄𝑅𝑅3 + 𝜀𝜀 
 
and finally we will regress all independent indicators jointly,  
Eq. 3.8 
                                            
7 For statistical calculations EViews 6 was used 
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𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀 =  𝛽𝛽1 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸 + 𝛽𝛽4𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝑄𝑄𝑅𝑅 + 𝜀𝜀 
3.5.2 Validity Testing 
Compliance with the assumptions of the best linear unbiased estimator 
will be tested on the following: 
• Normal distribution 
• Heteroskedasticity 
• Multicollinearity 
• Model specification  
Further details in chapter 4, appendix B and C. 
3.6 Criticisms of the Methodology 
Time matching problems – While the book-values in the regression is 
reported based on the fiscal year end dates, the return indexes are 
retrieved based on the month of the issues. This allows for an up to six 
month mismatching in time from issue to issue depending on when the 
issue is made and when the company ends its fiscal year. However, going 
to quarterly data for book values would lose a great deal of observations 
due to information not being available.  
Time frame is not long enough – An equity issue made in order to 
finance a long term investment might affect returns negatively in the 
following few years until the investment starts to pay off.  Apart from 
that, studies have shown that companies try to keep their dividends at an 
even level even through business and market cycles.  Also the efficient 
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market hypothesis suggests that future earnings at equal or higher levels 
should be reflected in the share price before they are realized. Since the 
RI measure used is composed of both dividends and changes in equity 
prices the one year time frame is considered to be sufficient, which was 
also consider sufficient by Baker and Wurgler (2000). Also any 
information advantage the companies might have compared to the 
market is likely to be of diminishing nature, and show up the strongest in 
the short-term. 
Survival bias – Our depending variable cannot take into account the 
companies which ceased to exist within one year after the issue. The 
removal of these companies from the dataset leads to a survivor bias 
which is likely to remove some of the companies that issue equity for 
market timing reasons. It is also reasonable to assume that it removes less 
than average of the companies which are using issues to finance 
investments and more of the companies which are issuing because they 
are in need of liquidity.  
Risk reflection – As indicated by a company’s historical beta value, 
different companies have a different sensitivity to changes in the market 
cycle. This could lead to a leveraging effect in our change in RI-measure 
for companies with comparably high or low betas. Previous studies 
involving market timing has been criticized by Fama (1998) for the same 
deficiency.    
What is the RI measuring? – Another problem is to know if the decrease 
in return measures normalization after an overvaluation or the market’s 
reactions to not being certain of what degree of information asymmetry 
that exists and what the SEOs signal. The answer is most likely that it is 
both to some extent but twelve months after an issue most unfounded 
signaling effects should be resolved. 
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3.7 Reliability 
Apart from fulfilling the validity assumptions of the ordinary least 
squares-method described in 3.5.2 the main concern about this study is 
whether or not the study actually measures what is supposed to be 
measured.  
Since market timing has a lot of elements of behavioral character, 
measuring it in a quantitative way becomes a game of definitions and 
subjective judgments. This being said, we believe the arguments presented 
for the suggested indicators show they can be used to indicate market 
timing behavior and the depending variable to measure relative 
performance.  
The possibility to generalize the results to other markets is dependent on 
the similarities between them in regulations, traditions, conditions etc., 
which differ over time and jurisdictions. The results should be possible to 
generalize to similar markets, such as those existing in western countries 
with Anglo-American characteristics.  
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Chapter 4 - Empirical Results 
This chapter will present our empirical findings. There will also be a presentation of the 
validity testing that has been made to prove our models robustness. 
4.1 Regressions  
This chapter reports and discusses the empirical result from the 
following regressions:  
• the first regression has tested to which extent companies 
changed their capital structure in relation to the ROM 
• the second regression has tested if the companies equity 
preference in relation to the ROM 
• the third regression has tested if the time past from the 
quarterly report in relation to the ROM 
•  and the final multivariate regression model shows all the 
indicators mentioned above being tested jointly and if they 
have any power in explaining the changes in the ROM   
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4.1.1 Results from Univariate Regressions  
The table 4.1 below contains a summary of statistics for the first three 
regressions.  
Table 4.1 Univariate OLS regressions of indictors over ROM 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  
  
 
  
Variable   C ERCH^3 C PRE C TSLQR 
Coefficient   -0.70216 0.002011 -0.66544 -0.32916 -1.1085 0.654112 
t-statistic   -5.33489 10.18232 -4.08093 -2.1842 -3.6072 1.275326 
P-value 
(one tail) 
 0 0 0.00005 0.014955 0.00019 0.101706 
P-value 
(two tail) 
 0 0 0.0001 0.0299 0.0004 0.2034 
Std. Error   0.131617 0.000198 0.16306 0.150701 0.307302 0.512898 
R-squared  0.295654  0.018949  0.006595  N  249  249  249  Description: This table report results of three regression models. Model 1 represents 
regression of the return over market on the equity ratio change. Model 2 represent 
regression of the return over market on the preference for equity. Model 3 represents 
regression of the return over market on the time since last quarterly report. By using p-
value of one tail* test the coefficient of ERCH and PRE are significant at 1 % and 5 % 
levels, whereas coefficient of TSLQR is insignificant at 1%, 5 % and 10 % percent.   
 
Model 1 in the table 4.1 contains the results of the univariate regression of 
the ERCH indicators association with ROM. The coefficient of the 
ERCH indicator is positively associated with the change in ROM in the 
next twelve months. The probability value (p-value) shows the coefficient 
is statistically significant, the degree of explanation in the model is the 
highest compared to the other two models. However, the direction of the 
coefficient shows the ERCH indicator is not consistent with the expected 
relation to ROM under the assumption of successful market timing 
behavior.   
The results of model 2 are presented in table 4.1 and indicate an inverse 
relationship between the PRE and ROM. The value of the coefficient is 
statistically significant at 1 percent significant level and its direction 
indicates that the PRE is negatively associated with the ROM, which is in 
line with the assumptions under successful market timing behavior.  
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The final model in the table 4.1 shows the results of the regressions the 
TSLQR indicator with return over market. The coefficient of this model 
has a positive sign, but is not significantly different from zero.  
4.1.2 Results from Multivariate Regressions 
Table 4.2 presents the results of the multivariate regression, where the 
three indicators were tested jointly in the model. The result for the two 
indicators ERCH and PRE have similarity to result from the univariate 
regression and the coefficients have same direction as before and both are 
statistically significant at 1%. However the coefficient of the TSLQR 
becomes statistically significant and goes against what was expected if 
successful market timing was present.  
Table 4.2 Multivariate OLS regressions of indictors over ROM 
                                                      𝐑𝐑𝐑𝐑𝐑𝐑 =∝ +𝛃𝛃𝟏𝟏 𝐄𝐄𝐑𝐑𝐄𝐄𝐄𝐄𝟑𝟑 +𝛃𝛃𝟐𝟐 𝐏𝐏𝐑𝐑𝐄𝐄+𝛃𝛃𝟑𝟑 𝐓𝐓𝐓𝐓𝐓𝐓𝐓𝐓 + 𝛆𝛆 
Variable  Coefficient t-statistic Prob (one 
tail) 
Prob (two 
tail) 
Std. Error 
C -1.09644 -4.3481 0.00001 0.00002 0.252165 
ERCH^3 0.002071 10.73005 0 0 0.000193 
PRE -0.42597 -3.40017 0.000393 0.0008 0.12528 
TSLQR 1.053447 2.492148 0.00668 0.0134 0.422706 
F-value 41.81457  
P-value 0 
R-squared 0.340469 
N 249     
Description: This table report results of the multivariate regression model. This model 1 
represents regression of the return over market on the equity ratio change, preference for 
equity, and time since last quarterly report. By using p-value of one tail t-test the coefficient 
of all three indicators ERCH, PRE, and TLSQR are significant with 1 % and 5 % levels.  
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4.2 Validity Tests 
In order to make sure the regressions and hypothesis testing results are 
valid, a number of test were performed. For more detailed results refer to 
the appendix. 
• One of the assumptions of the least square method is that 
the residuals have to be normally distributed. According to 
Brooks (2002) if the sample is sufficiently large, the test 
statistic will asymptomatically follow the appropriate 
distribution even in the absence of error terms. Therefore 
due to our large sample the violation of normal distribution 
has no major implications. 
• Heteroskedasticity in the model was not present. The White 
test with cross terms was performed indicating no support 
for presence of heteroskedasticity in the data.  
• Misspecification of the model was tested using the RESET 
test which did not indicate any non-linearity.  
• The final step was to test for multicollinearity. An implicit 
assumption of the OLS estimation is that the independent 
variables are not correlated with each other. Two methods 
have been used to detect multicollinearity in the model. In 
the first case a correlation matrix has been produced in 
table 4.3.   
Table 4.3 Correlation matrix for indicators  
Correlation ROM ERCH^3 PRE TSLQR 
ROM  1    
ERCH03  0.544665 1   
PRE  -0.13699 0.049532 1  
TSLQR  0.081208 -0.055286 0.104141 1 
Description: This table report the correlation coefficient between the indicators 
used in the model. The value of the correlation coefficient between return over 
market and equity rate change is the highest compared to the other, but none of 
them can be considered to be highly correlated.  
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The results in the correlation matrix indicate the absence of the 
multicollinearity between the independent indicators. Another more 
precise method of detecting multicollinearity is by using Klien’s rule of 
thumb. 
Table 4.4 Klien's Rule of Thumb on multicollinearity 
Regression Models                                      𝑹𝑹𝟐𝟐 Outcome 
Model 4 0.340469  
Auxiliary Regression 1  0.006147 𝑹𝑹𝟐𝟐 > R2∗ 
Auxiliary Regression 2 0.013912 𝑹𝑹𝟐𝟐 > R2∗ 
Description: This table report the results of Klien’s Rule of Thumb test.  Model 4 represent 
the value of 𝑹𝑹𝟐𝟐  for regression in table 4.2. Auxiliary Regression 1 represents the regression 
of the equity ratio change on the preference for equity and time since last quarterly report. 
Auxiliary Regression 2 represents the regression of the preference for equity on the equity 
ratio change and time since last quarterly report. With this test we obtain values of  𝑹𝑹𝟐𝟐∗ from 
the two auxiliary regressions. Then, the values of 𝑹𝑹𝟐𝟐∗ from the auxiliary regressions are 
compared with  𝑹𝑹𝟐𝟐  from the Model 4. Since 𝑹𝑹𝟐𝟐  from the Model 4 is higher, it can be said 
that our model does not suffer from multicollinearity.  
 
The Klein’s Rule of Thumb-test auxiliary regressions are presented on the 
table above also does not indicate a multicollinearity problem. From the 
methods used above it can be said that the independent variables are not closely 
related or orthogonal to one another (Gujarati, 2003). 
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Chapter 5 - Analysis 
This chapter we will analyze the empirical results, both in relation to prior theories and 
the methodology. The aim is to explain our findings, their implications and put them 
into a larger context. 
5.1 Equity Ratio Change 
As argued in the methodology chapter, any significant equity ratio 
change was expected to be negatively related to the return over market in 
order to support successful market timing behavior. The empirical results 
showed quite the contrary. Companies who raised their equity ratio did 
not lower but increased their returns over market. Therefore we cannot 
find support for successful market timing by looking at the equity ratio 
change. 
 
Table 5.1 
Variable  Coefficient  Prob(1 tail) Prob (two tails) Std. Error  
ERCH^3 0.002071 0 0 0.000193 
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Fig. 5.1 Result from the Equity Ratio Change 
 
Source: Created by the authors 
 
A different aspect is that the dataset does not include companies which 
went out of business within twelve months after the issue. These excluded 
examples might have offered the most severe cases of overvaluation. The 
survivor bias would leave a disproportionate number of companies 
which did not issue for market timing reasons and hence alter the results 
of the study.  
This finding can be related to the lemons market argument put forward 
by Korajczyk et al. (1991), that the market expects all firms who issue 
equity to have bad private information, and expects firms with good 
private information not to issue. However, this example is an extreme 
and it can be assumed that a part of the companies who went dead are 
what can be considered a lemon company, while assuming surviving ones 
not to be. This can be one of the reasons for the positive relation between 
increases in equity ratio and increasing stock return. 
Another theory that might explain the increase in market value if the 
firm increases its equity ratio might be explained by Eckbo et al. (2000), 
who found that issuing firms do not underperform the market. They 
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argued that firms reduce risk in three different ways; risk of default, 
dependence of inflation and a higher liquidity. By lowering these risks 
the market might have a more positive valuation of the firm. Offering a 
further possible skewing of the sample, Kim and Weisbach (2008) 
showed that firms use the greater majority of the issues to finance 
investment opportunities, which usually gives a higher diversification in 
the revenue stream, thus lowering the risk even further. 
The dynamic tradeoff theory offers an explanation for the results. From 
the company’s perspective, levering towards a higher equity ratio in most 
cases implies a higher cost of financing. A company aiming to act in the 
best interest of its financiers would therefore only issue equity if they 
would be able to produce sufficiently higher returns. However, since the 
model was built to test for successful market timing behavior no 
conclusions about tradeoff can be made. 
5.2 Preference for Equity 
In line with our prior expectations, the companies who had a higher 
preference for equity performed worse during the next twelve months. 
This supports the theory that managers can successfully time the market. 
 
Table 5.2 
Variable  Coefficient  Prob(1 tail) Prob (two tails) Std. Error  
PRE -0.42597 0.000393 0.0008 0.12528 
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Fig 5.2 Result from the Preference for Equity 
 
Source: Created by the authors 
 
The result presented above in the diagram indicates what Baker and 
Wurgler (2000) found in their study, where a successful market timing 
behavior would support what managers perceive as investors not being 
fully rational.  
5.3 Time Since Last Quarterly Report 
The interpretation of successful market timing behavior in this indicator 
would be; the longer between an information release and an issue the 
worse a company will perform in the future. This will happen due to the 
diminishing value of information over time and the information 
asymmetry would be adjusted as more information becomes public. 
However, the results showed the opposite. Firms announcing an issue a 
short time after a report did worse compared to companies who issued 
further from one. These results contradict the “successful”-criteria of the 
successful market timing behavior.  
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Table 5.3 
Variable  Coefficient  Prob(1 tail) Prob(two tails) Std. Error  
TSLQR 1.053447 0.00668 0.0134 0.422706 
 
Fig. 5.3 Result from the Time Since Last Quarterly Report 
 
Source: Created by the authors 
 
One possible explanation can be found in the signaling theory. The 
market might interpret an issue made far from the latest report as much 
riskier than one made close after the issue. If the signaling effect is 
stronger than the overvaluation the company will become undervalued 
due to the issue. Over the next year more recent and relevant information 
becomes available and the company’s value recovers. As indicated above 
in the figure 5.3, firms which make an equity issue might drop below 
their fair value, but start to transfer back over time. 
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Fig. 5.4 Result from the Time Since Last Quarterly Report 
 
Source: Created by the Authors 
 
Asquith and Mullins (1986) discuss signaling value of different policy 
decisions where financing decisions should have the strongest signaling 
effect. Thus, supporting the likelihood of signaling effects being stronger 
than overvaluations.  
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Chapter 6 - Conclusions 
In this chapter we will give our conclusions based on the sections presented earlier in 
the thesis and there is also going to be a section giving suggestions for further research 
into the subject of market timing. 
6.1 Conclusions 
The purpose of this thesis has been to study successful market timing 
behavior in connection to SEOs on the London Stock Exchange and to 
see if investors fail to identify and correct these discrepancies.  
In the creation of our indicators, preference for equity was the one which 
we considered intuitively most descriptive of market timing behavior. 
On its own it explained 1.9% of the variation, considering the amount of 
possible variables that could affect the ROM this value is definitely not 
negligible. Preference for equity gave the expected result and granted 
support to the existence of successful market timing behavior.  
In our model Equity Ratio Change was the indicator which had the 
highest degree of explanation for the residuals but the trend of the 
indicator did not support successful market timing. In our study it would 
seem like dynamic tradeoff theory best explained the effect since it allows 
the firm to deviate from the target debt ratio, but usually re-lever back 
over the coming time period.  
The third indicator, Time Since Last Quarterly Report was the indicator 
which had the smallest explanatory power and also no statistical 
significance on its own. In the context of the multivariate regression, 
Time Since Last Quarterly Report was statistically significant, but just 
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like Equity Ratio Change, the coefficient did not support successful 
market timing. We believe the most likely explanation to be a strong 
signaling theory effect, where signaling prevails over any eventual 
overvaluation.  
To sum up our findings, we identified some support for successful 
market timing behavior but in the context of the overall study, the results 
must be considered to be inconclusive. The intuitive explanations for the 
results is that investors are overly cautious towards companies issuing 
SEOs with some of the characteristics we have studied and lower their 
values at the time of the issue, resulting in an undervaluation. When 
more information becomes available the investors adjusts the valuation 
upwards. 
Our results would be of interest for investors who worry about 
information asymmetries in connections to SEOs, to whom our results 
indicate that, the information asymmetry actually work in their favor. 
However, a longer study and a larger set of variables would be needed to 
more thoroughly study the alternative effects. A new model would need 
to be constructed which included an ability to better separate 
motivations for issues and handle the companies which no longer were 
traded a year later.   
Other researchers worth noting, with studies finding support for similar 
effects as those we identified; Kim and Weisbach (2008) who showed that 
firms making an SEO use the capital to finance investments, which gives 
an understanding of why the returns increase over the coming year. 
Kaylan and Titman (2007), whom found that firms act as if they have a 
target debt ratio, but allow themselves to deviate from it  if investment 
opportunities arise. This argument is in line with the findings in the 
equity ratio change when tradeoff is the dominant determinant of 
financing decisions. Asquith and Mullins (1986) argue that signaling 
effects are stronger than overvaluations. Eckbo et al. (2000) finds that 
issues on general, outperforms the market because of the infused equity, 
this is in line with our Equity Ratio Change findings. But it should be 
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noted that, behavior indicators apart, our sample on average decreased 
their performance.    
6.2 Suggestions for Further Research 
Apart for the previously suggested extension of the model, we have the 
following recommendations for further research: 
• In constructing our research we wanted to look at insider trading 
before a SEO as an indicator of market timing behavior. The logic 
being that, managers selling their private holdings, does not  have 
to worry about sending signals to the market as strong as the 
actual SEO and therefore have an opportunity to capture value 
from an over valuation earlier than the company. We believe this 
to be a very strong indicator, the reason we did not use it was that 
the information needed was not readily available and manually 
collecting it would be beyond the timeframe of this study. 
• Another study which would add to the field of market timing 
would be to conduct a qualitative study, where the firms CFOs for 
instance are asked what factors determine their choice when 
deciding on how to finance their company. As mentioned, the 
factors needed to describe market timing are difficult to 
objectively measure in a quantitative way and a qualitative study 
with interviews or a questionnaire would be able to give a more 
specific explanation on to what degree the companies try to time 
the market when deciding on a SEO.   
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APPENDIX 
 Appendix A  
Tables containing results from the four regression models 
Table A1 
Model 1       
ROM =  -0.702159826346 + 0.00201133761064*ERCH^3  
Method: Least Squares      
Sample: 1 
249 
      
Included observations: 249     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.     
C -0.70216 0.131617 -5.33489 0   
ERCH^3 0.002011 0.000198 10.18232 0   
R^2 Adjusted 
R^2 
S.E. of 
regression 
SSR Log L F-statistic Prob(F-
statistic) 
0.295654 0.292802 2.073776 1062.236 -533.925 103.6797 0 
        
Table A2 
Model 2       
ROM =  -0.665437784018 - 0.329160776505*PRE   
Method: Least Squares      
Sample: 1 
249 
      
Included observations: 249     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-
Statistic 
Prob.     
C -0.66544 0.16306 -4.08093 0.0001   
PRE -0.32916 0.150701 -2.1842 0.0299   
R^2 Adjusted 
R^2 
S.E. of 
regression 
SSR Log L F-
statistic 
Prob(F-
statistic) 
0.018949 0.014977 2.447455 1479.538 -
575.179 
4.770736 0.029888 
 
Table A3 
Model 3       
ROM =  -1.1084998692 + 0.654112144804*TSLQR   
Method: Least Squares      
Sample: 1 
249 
      
Included observations: 247     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-
Statistic 
Prob.     
C -1.1085 0.307302 -3.6072 0.0004   
TSLQR 0.654112 0.512898 1.275326 0.2034   
R^2 Adjusted 
R^2 
S.E. of 
regression 
SSR Log L F-
statistic 
Prob(F-
statistic) 
0.006595 0.00254 2.469049 1493.57 -
572.721 
1.626456 0.203402 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Appendix A continued  
Table A4 
Model 4       
 ROM =  -1.09643925095 + 0.00207102877055*ERCH^3 - 0.425971994822*PRE + 1.05344677869*TSLQR 
Method: Least Squares      
Sample: 1 249       
Included observations: 247     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.     
C -1.09644 0.252165 -4.3481 0   
ERCH^3 0.002071 0.000193 10.73005 0   
PRE -0.42597 0.12528 -3.40017 0.0008   
TSLQR 1.053447 0.422706 2.492148 0.0134   
R^2 Adjusted R^2 S.E. of regression SSR Log L F-statistic Prob(F-statistic) 
0.340469 0.332327 2.020059 991.5947 -522.134 41.81457 0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix B 
Tables containing results from the White test for presence of heteroscedasticity 
Table B1 
                  Model 1 Heteroskedasticity Test: White     
F-statistic 0.141864     Prob. F(2,246) 0.8678   
Obs*R-squared 0.286858     Prob. Chi-Square(2) 0.8664   
Scaled explained 
SS 
1.985094     Prob. Chi-Square(2) 0.3706   
Dependent Variable: RESID^2     
Method: Least Squares      
Sample: 1 249      
Included observations: 249     
Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.      
C 4.248579 1.02422 4.14811 0   
ERCH^3 0.005611 0.012017 0.466965 0.6409   
(ERCH^3)^2 4.99E-07 1.16E-06 0.430474 0.6672   
R^2 Adjusted 
R^2 
S.E. of 
regression 
SSR Log L F-statistic Prob(F-
statistic) 
0.001152 -0.006969 16.08711 63663.6 -1043.533 0.141864 0.86781 
Table B2 
Model 2 Heteroskedasticity Test: White     
F-statistic 0.219274     Prob. F(2,246) 0.8033   
Obs*R-squared 0.443105     Prob. Chi-Square(2) 0.8013   
Scaled explained 
SS 
6.553722     Prob. Chi-Square(2) 0.0377   
Dependent Variable: RESID^2     
Method: Least Squares      
Sample: 1 249      
Included observations: 249     
Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.      
C 6.533351 2.440993 2.676513 0.0079   
PRE 0.703527 2.09809 0.335318 0.7377   
PRE^2 -0.705828 1.100318 -0.641476 0.5218   
R^2 Adjusted 
R^2 
S.E. of 
regression 
SSR Log L F-statistic Prob(F-
statistic) 
0.00178 -0.006336 32.74765 263812.5 -1220.526 0.219274 0.803259 
Table B3 
Model 3 Heteroskedasticity Test: White     
F-statistic 0.009756     Prob. F(2,244) 0.9903   
Obs*R-squared 0.019751     Prob. Chi-Square(2) 0.9902   
Scaled explained 
SS 
0.279985     Prob. Chi-Square(2) 0.8694   
Dependent Variable: RESID^2     
Method: Least Squares      
Sample: 1 249      
Included observations: 249     
Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.      
C 6.77363 5.60509 1.208478 0.228   
TSLQR -3.410211 27.1238 -0.125728 0.9001   
TSLQR^2 2.867152 26.91965 0.106508 0.9153   
R^2 Adjusted 
R^2 
S.E. of 
regression 
SSR Log L F-statistic Prob(F-
statistic) 
0.00008 -0.008116 32.65789 260235.2 -1210.032 0.009756 0.990292 
 
Appendix B continued 
Table B4 
Model 4 Heteroskedasticity Test: White     
F-statistic 1.279429     Prob. F(9,237) 0.2487   
Obs*R-squared 11.44467     Prob. Chi-Square(9) 0.2465   
Scaled explained SS 70.93815     Prob. Chi-Square(9) 0   
Dependent Variable: RESID^2     
Method: Least Squares      
Sample: 1 249      
Included observations: 249     
Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.      
C 8.766803 2.605502 3.364727 0.0009   
ERCH^3 0.000299 0.018516 0.01614 0.9871   
(ERCH^3)^2 1.85E-07 3.78E-06 0.04902 0.9609   
(ERCH^3)*PRE 0.000259 0.02946 0.00879 0.993   
(ERCH^3)*TSLQR 0.002632 0.060226 0.043704 0.9652   
PRE 4.034982 1.607331 2.510362 0.0127   
PRE^2 -0.267282 0.504687 -0.5296 0.5969   
PRE*TSLQR -4.082687 2.850656 -1.432192 0.1534   
TSLQR -22.97492 12.14318 -1.892003 0.0597   
TSLQR^2 19.18399 12.01847 1.59621 0.1118   
R^2 Adjusted 
R^2 
S.E. of regression SSR Log L F-statistic Prob(F-statistic) 
0.046335 0.01012 14.32364 48624.51 -1002.866 1.279429 0.248735 
Description:  Table B1, B2, B3 and B4 report the White test result for heteroskedasticty. In this test cross terms are included as well; 
therefore it was tested not just for pure heteroscedasticity but for error specification. The results for the four models indicated that the 
null hypothesis cannot be rejected; all the coefficients of interest are insignificant. Hence, our model does not suffer from 
heteroscedasticity.  
Table B5 
Model 4 Heteroskedasticity Test: White without cross terms   
F-statistic 0.489903     Prob. F(3,243) 0.6896   
Obs*R-squared 1.484922     Prob. Chi-Square(3) 0.6858   
Scaled explained SS 9.204072     Prob. Chi-Square(3) 0.0267   
Dependent Variable: RESID^2     
Method: Least Squares      
Sample: 1 249      
Included observations: 249     
Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.      
C 5.392016 1.516074 3.556566 0.0005   
(ERCH^3)^2 -3.20E-08 1.33E-07 -0.240775 0.8099   
PRE^2 -0.102144 0.467029 -0.218711 0.8271   
TSLQR^2 -3.462043 2.979041 -1.162133 0.2463   
R^2 Adjusted R^2 S.E. of regression SSR Log L F-statistic Prob(F-statistic) 
0.006012 -0.00626 14.44166 50680.45 -1007.98 0.489903 0.689608 
Description: This table report result the White test result for heteroskedasticity. This is model 4 where cross terms are not included. 
Even though cross terms are not included, this does not change our results. The result indicates that the null hypothesis cannot be 
rejected, and the value of coefficient of interest is insignificant.  
 
 
 
 Appendix C 
Tables containing results from the RESET test (Ramsey test) 
Table C1 
RESET Ramsey Test         
Model 1     Model 2     
Number of fitted terms  1   Number of fitted terms  1   
 Coefficient Std. 
Error 
t-
Statistic 
Prob.    Coefficient Std. 
Error 
t-
Statistic 
Prob.   
C -0.6696 0.1346 -4.9740 0.0000 C -1.0214 0.4488 -2.2757 0.0237 
ERCH^3 0.0002 0.0017 0.0910 0.9276 PRE -0.6493 0.4051 -1.6027 0.1103 
FITTED^2 -0.0419 0.0369 -1.1349 0.2575 FITTED^2 0.6465 0.7594 0.8513 0.3954 
F-statistic 1.2881     Prob. F(1,246) 0.2575 F-statistic 0.7248     Prob. F(1,246) 0.3954 
Log likelihood 
ratio 
1.3004     Prob. Chi-
Square(1) 
0.2541 Log likelihood 
ratio 
0.73254     Prob. Chi-
Square(1) 
0.3921 
Number of fitted terms 2   Number of fitted terms  2   
C -0.2112 0.5089 -0.4150 0.6785 C 0.3478 0.8441 0.4120 0.6807 
ERCH^3 0.0009 0.0019 0.5079 0.612 PRE 0.0365 0.5396 0.0677 0.9461 
FITTED^2 -0.9934 1.0192 -0.9747 0.3307 FITTED^2 -3.5875 2.3405 -1.5328 0.1266 
FITTED^3 -0.0446 0.0478 -0.9342 0.3511 FITTED^3 -1.9692 1.0303 -1.9113 0.0571 
F-statistic 1.0801     Prob. F(2,245) 0.3412 F-statistic 2.1928     Prob. F(2,245) 0.1138 
Log likelihood 
ratio 
2.1858     Prob. Chi-
Square(2) 
0.3352 Log likelihood 
ratio 
4.4179     Prob. Chi-
Square(2) 
0.1098 
Table C2 
RESET Ramsey Test         
Model 3     Model 4     
Number of fitted terms  1   Number of fitted terms  1   
 Coefficient Std. 
Error 
t-
Statistic 
Prob.    Coefficient Std. 
Error 
t-
Statistic 
Prob.   
C 0.26554 5.57231 0.04765 0.96200 C -1.0321 0.2648 -3.8969 0.0001 
TSLQR -0.56143 4.94874 -
0.11345 
0.90980 ERCH^3 0.0007 0.0017 0.4473 0.6550 
FITTED^2 -1.17698 4.76585 -
0.24696 
0.80510 PRE -0.4051 0.1281 -3.1632 0.0018 
F-statistic 0.0610     Prob. F(1,244) 0.8051 TSLQR 0.9737 0.4346 2.2405 0.0260 
Log likelihood 
ratio 
0.0617     Prob. Chi-
Square(1) 
0.8038 FITTED^2 -0.0296 0.0369 -0.8007 0.4241 
Number of fitted terms 2   F-statistic 0.6412     Prob. F(1,242) 0.4241 
C -41.2690 47.2954 -0.8726 0.3838 Log likelihood ratio 0.6536     Prob. Chi-
Square(1) 
0.4188 
TSLQR 30.8013 35.80776 0.8602 0.3905 Number of fitted 
terms 2 
-1.0160 0.5148 -1.9738 0.0495 
FITTED^2 62.2077 71.83145 0.8660 0.3873 C -1.0160 0.5148 -1.9738 0.0495 
FITTED^3 26.9087 30.42742 0.8844 0.3774 ERCH^3 0.0007 0.0017 0.4445 0.6571 
F-statistic 0.4215     Prob. F(2,243) 0.6565 PRE -0.3981 0.2302 -1.7295 0.0850 
Log likelihood 
ratio 
0.8554     Prob. Chi-
Square(2) 
0.652 TSLQR 0.9557 0.6581 1.4523 0.1477 
     FITTED^2 -0.0424 0.3560 -0.1192 0.9052 
     FITTED^3 -0.0006 0.0162 -0.0364 0.9710 
     F-statistic 0.3199     Prob. F(2,241) 0.7265 
     Log likelihood ratio 0.6549     Prob. Chi-
Square(2) 
0.7207 
Description: Tables C1 and C2 report results from the RESET test.  In this case it was tested if the non-linearity is present in the models. 
The four models were tested and the results indicate that the null hypothesis cannot be rejected and the values of coefficients are 
statistically insignificant. Therefore it can be said that our model does not suffer from non-linearity. The regressions were done with 
two fitted terms.  
